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technology or relative prices that causes the labor share to decline must also cause an equal increase in the capital share. This result of the model is very general and does not depend on assumptions of household behavior, firm ownership, or the functional form of the production function. I calibrate the model and show that the observed increase in markups can explain the decline in the shares of both labor and capital.
Furthermore, I show that the increase in markups inferred from the data causes a large steady-state decline in output. If we accept the assumptions of the model, then we are led to conclude that the decline in the shares of labor and capital are caused by an increase in markups and are an inefficient outcome.
I provide reduced form empirical evidence that an increase in markups plays a significant role in the decline of the labor share. In the data I am unable to directly measure markups, instead I proxy for markups using industry concentration. I show that those industries that experience larger increases in concentration also experience larger declines in the labor share. Univariate regressions suggest that the increase in industry concentration can account for the entire decline in the labor share. These regression results rely on crosssectional variation, rather than time series variation. Furthermore, the regression results do not rely on capital data and are not subject to concerns with the measurement of capital. Taken as a whole, my results suggest that the decline in the shares of labor and capital are due to an increase in markups and call into question the conclusion that the decline in the labor share is an efficient outcome. furthermore the capital share might decrease slightly.
1 By contrast, I find a large decline in the capital share. The difference in our findings is driven by our treatment of the required rate of return on capital. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Rognlie (2015) use a constant required rate of return on capital, whereas I infer the required rate of return from market prices. Market prices show that the required rate of return on capital declines sharply over the last thirty years, which results in a dramatic decline in the capital share. The magnitude of the decline in the capital share is of central importance for understanding why the labor share has declined. While a decrease in the labor share and little change in the capital share is consistent with a variety of economic explanations, a simultaneous decline in both the labor share and the capital share of similar magnitudes forces us to consider changes in markups as the explanation. Further details appear in Sections 2.6 and 3.4.
Previous studies have also considered the welfare implications of the decline of the labor share. Fernald and Jones (2014) , drawing on Zeira (1998) , show that a decline in the labor share that is due to the mechanization of production leads to rising growth and income. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) find that the decline in the labor share is due in part to technological progress that reduces the relative cost of capital, which leads to a substantial increase in consumer welfare, and in part to an increase in markups which reduces welfare. The authors find that the increase in welfare due to the change in the relative price of capital is far greater than the decline that is due to the change in markups. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) present a model in which the labor share fluctuates in response to capital-augmenting technological change and show that the endogenous process of technology adoption, in the long run, restores the labor share to its previous level. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) present a model in which a decline in the bargaining power of labor leads to a temporary decline in the labor share and a long-run increase in welfare. By contrast, I find that the decline in the labor share is due entirely to an increase in markups, is accompanied by a decline in output and consumer welfare, and that without a subsequent reduction in markups, the labor share will not revert to its previous level.
This paper contributes to a large literature on the macroeconomic importance of profits and markups. Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) provide evidence suggesting that the share of profits in value added was close to zero in the period prior to 1987. Basu and Fernald (1997) find that U.S. industries had a profit share of most 3 percent during the period 1959 -1989 . Hulten (1986 and Berndt and Fuss (1986) show that in settings without profits, estimating the payments to capital as realized value added less realized payments to labor leads to an unbiased estimate of capital payments and that this estimation can properly account for cyclical patterns in capital utilization. Past empirical estimates of small economic profits together with the potential theoretical advantage of indirectly inferring capital payments has led many researchers to prefer the 1 See Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) section IV.B and column 6 of table 4; Rognlie (2015) Section II.B assumption of zero profits over the direct measurement of capital payments. The seminal works of Jorgenson et al. (1987) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) that measure changes in U.S. productivity do not estimate total payments to capital, 2 and many subsequent studies follow in their path. By contrast, my findings overturn previous empirical measurements of profits. While I confirm previous estimates of low profits in the early 1980s, I show that profits have substantially increased over the last 30 years. I show that these profits are potentially large enough to generate large declines in the shares of labor and capital, as well as a large decline in output.
The Capital Share
In this section I document a large decline in the capital share and a large increase in the profit share in the U.S. non-financial corporate sector over the last 30 years. Following Hall and Jorgenson (1967) , I compute a series of capital payments equal to the product of the required rate of return on capital and the value of the capital stock. I find that the required rate of return on capital declines sharply, driven by a large decline in the risk-free rate. At the same time, the ratio of capital to gross value added does not sufficiently increase to offset the decline in the required rate of return, and as a result the capital share declines. Measured in percent terms, the decline in the capital share (30%) is much more dramatic than the decline in the labor share (10%). My results show that the shares of both labor and capital are declining and are jointly offset by an increase in the share of profits.
Accounting
I assume that the true model of accounting for the U.S. non-financial corporate sector in current dollars is
is the current dollar price of output and P Y t Y t is the current dollar value of gross value added. w t is the current dollar wage rate and w t L t is the total current dollar expenditures on labor. R t is the required rate of return on capital, P K t−1 is the price of capital purchased in period t − 1, K t is the stock of capital used in production in period t and is equal to the stock of capital available at the end of period t − 1, and R t P K t−1 K t is the total current dollar capital payments. Π t is the current dollar profits. This can be written in shares of gross value added as
2 See for example Jorgenson et al. (2005) , p. 157.
where
is the labor share,
is the capital share and S
is the profit share.
Mapping to the Data
In the data, nominal gross value added P Y Y is the sum of expenditures on labor wL, gross operating surplus, and taxes on production and imports less subsidies. By separating gross operating surplus into capital payments RP K K and profits Π, we get P Y Y = wL + RP K K + Π + taxes on production and imports less subsidies (2.
3)
The main challenge in constructing the capital share of gross value added is to compute the unobserved required rate of return on capital. There are two approaches to constructing this required rate of return.
The first approach, pioneered by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) , specifies a required ex-ante rate of return to capital that is derived from the standard model of production theory. The second approach, often referred to as the ex-post rate of return on capital, assumes that all payments not made to labor are capital payments.
This second approach is equivalent to assuming that profits are zero and therefore it does not allow us to distinguish movements in the capital share and movements in the profit share. In order to construct separate time series of the capital and profits shares, I construct the required rate of return on capital as the ex-ante required rate of return. Complete details of the construction appear in the next subsection.
An additional consideration has to do with taxes and subsidies on production. Unlike taxes on corporate profits, it is unclear how to allocate taxes on production across capital, labor and profits. Consistent with previous research, I study the shares of labor, capital and profits without allocating the the taxes.
The Required Rate of Return on Capital
The construction of the required rate of return on capital follows Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and is equal to the rental rate of capital that occurs in equilibrium. The required rate of return on capital of type s is To clarify the terminology and units, consider a firm that uses 2000 square feet of office space and 100
laptops. The firm's nominal cost of borrowing in financial markets is 6% per year. The sale value of the office space is $880, 000 at the start of the year, and the office space is expected to appreciate in price by 4% and depreciate at a rate of 3%. The required rate of return on the office space is 5% and the annual cost of the office space is $44, 000 = 0.05 × $880, 000 (or $22 per square foot). The sale value of the 100 laptops is $70, 000 at the start of the year, and the laptops are expected to appreciate in price by (−10) % and depreciate at a rate of 25%. The required rate of return on the laptops is 41% and the annual cost of the laptops is $28, 700 = 0.41 × $70, 000 (or $287 per laptop). Total capital payments are $72, 700 and the total replacement cost of the capital is $950, 000. The aggregate required rate of return on capital is
$950,000 ≈ 0.08. If we further assume that the firm's gross value added for the year is $500, 000, then the firm's capital share is S K = $72,700 $500,000 ≈ 0.15.
Data
Data on nominal gross value added are taken from the National Income and Productivity Accounts (NIPA) BEA capital data provide measures of the capital stock, the depreciation rate of capital and inflation for 4 There are two major types of employee stock option: incentive stock options (ISO) and nonqualified stock options (NSO). An ISO cannot exceed 10 years, and options for no more than $100,000 worth of stock may become exercisable in any year. When the stock is sold, the difference between the market price and the exercise price of the stock options is reported as a capital gain on the employee's income tax return. The more common stock option used is the NSO. When exercised, an employee incurs a tax liability equal to the difference between the market price and the exercise price that is reported as wages; the company receives a tax deduction for the difference between the market price and the exercise price, which reduces the amount of taxes paid. Compensation of employees includes the exercising of NSO, but not the exercising of ISO. For further details see Moylan (2008) . three categories of capital (structures, equipment and intellectual property products), as well as a capital aggregate. The 14th comprehensive revision of NIPA in 2013 expanded its recognition of intangible capital beyond software to include expenditures for R&D and for entertainment, literary, and artistic originals as fixed investments.
The data cover the geographic area that consists of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. As an example, all economic activity by the foreign-owned Kia Motors automobile manufacturing plant in West Point, Georgia is included in the data and is reflected in the measures of value added, investment, capital, and compensation of employees. By contrast, all economic activity by the U.S.-owned the Ford automobile manufacturing plant in Almussafes, Spain is not included in the data and is not reflected in the measures of value added, investment, capital, and compensation of employees.
The construction of the required rate of return on capital requires that I specify the nominal cost of borrowing in financial markets, i, and asset specific expected inflation, E [π]. In the main results, I set i equal to the yield on Moody's Aaa bond portfolio. In the robustness subsection that follows the main results, I show that using the equity cost of capital or the weighted average cost of capital across debt and equity generates an even larger decline in the capital share. Throughout the results, asset-specific expected inflation is calculated as a three-year moving average of realized inflation. Replacing expected inflation with realized inflation generates very similar results. Figure 1 presents the time series of the required rate of return on capital for the U.S. non-financial corporate sector during the period 1984-2014. In the figure, the nominal cost of borrowing in financial markets is set to the yield on Moody's Aaa bond portfolio and expected inflation is calculated as a three-year moving average of realized inflation. The figure shows a clear and dramatic decline in the required rate of return on capital. This result is not surprising: during the sample period the risk-free rate (the yield on the tenyear treasury) undergoes a dramatic decline and risk premia do not increase. As a result, the nominal cost of borrowing in financial markets declines dramatically. During this same period there is little change in the other components of the required rate of return; the depreciation rate and expected capital inflation are roughly constant. The fitted linear trend shows a decline of 6.6 percentage points (or 39 percent). In summary, the required rate of return on capital declines sharply, driven by a large decline in the risk-free rate.
Results

Capital
The decline in the required rate of return on capital need not translate to a decline in the capital share.
Indeed, firms can respond to the decline in the required rate of return on capital by increasing their use of capital inputs. However, during the sample period, the ratio of capital to output does not increase sufficiently to offset the decline in the required required rate of return on capital and, as a result, the capital share declines. Figure 2 presents the time series of the capital share of gross value added for the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector during the period 1984-2014. The figure shows a clear and dramatic decline in the capital share. The fitted linear trend shows a decline of 7.2 percentage points (or 30 percent). In summary, firms did not accumulated enough capital to offset to decline in the required rate of return on capital and as a result the capital share of output declines sharply.
Profits
I construct profits as the difference between gross value added and the sum of labor costs, capital costs, and indirect taxes on production. This construction is described above in equation 2.3. Profits are constructed as a residual that measures the dollars left over from production after firms pay all measured costs of production.
The measure of profits includes economic profits and potentially unobserved costs of production. Figure 3 presents the time series of the profit share for the U.S. non-financial corporate sector during the period 1984-2014. Consistent with previous research, 5 I find that profits were very small at the beginning of the sample. However, they increased dramatically over the last three decades. The fitted linear trend shows that profits increased from 2.2% of gross value added in 1984 to 15.7% of gross value added in 2014, a more than sixfold increase of 13.5 percentage points. dramatic than the decline in the labor share (10%). The decline in shares of labor and capital are offset by a large increase in the share of profits. While the profit were very small at the start of the sample they have since increased by more than six-fold. In summary, the shares of labor and capital are both declining and are jointly offset by an increase in the share of profits.
Complete Picture of Gross Value Added
To offer a sense of magnitude, the combined shares of labor and capital decline 13.9 percentage points, which amounts to $ and that the value of this capital stock does not exceed $1.4 trillion. Second, I ask whether calculations of the required rate of return on capital that use the equity cost of capital or the weighted average cost across debt and equity lead to an increase in the capital share. I find that estimates of the required rate of return on capital based on the equity cost of capital or the weighted average cost of capital leads to a larger decline in the capital share. Last, I consider specifications of the required rate of return on capital that include the tax treatment of capital and debt, and I find that they lead to a large decline in the capital share.
Unobserved Capital
The BEA measures of capital include physical capital, such as structures and equipment, as well as measures of intangible capital, such as R&D, software, and artistic designs. Despite the BEA's efforts to account for intangible capital, it is possible that there are forms of intangible capital that are not included in the BEA measures. Indeed, past research has considered several forms of intangible capital that are not currently capitalized by the BEA. These additional forms of intangible capital include organizational capital, market research, branding, and training of employees.
Extending the analysis to account for an omitted or unobserved capital stock requires two separate corrections. First, we must correct the measure of gross value added so tha it includes the production of the omitted or unobserved capital stock. 6 Currently, the national accounts expense any costs of producing productive assets that are not classified by the BEA as capital. Recognizing these potentially productive assets as capital requires that we reclassify the costs of producing these productive assets as investment rather than intermediate consumption. This correction increases gross value added by the nominal value of investment in these productive assets. This correction has been discussed extensively by McGrattan and Prescott (2010, 2014) . Second, we must correct the measure of capital payments so that it includes payments on the omitted or unobserved capital stock. Currently, my measure of capital payments includes only those assets that the BEA classifies as capital. Recognizing these potentially productive assets as capital requires that I include them in my measure of capital payments. As a result my measurement of capital payments would increase.
The resulting corrections to the construction of capital costs and profits are as follows. Total nominal capital payments equal as currently recorded by the BEA, and I X is nominal investment in the potentially omitted or unobserved stock of capital X. Nominal profits equal
Having made these corrections, we can ask how large the unobserved capital stock would have to be in order to eliminate profits. Clearly, if the profit correction I X − R X P X X is allowed to be any arbitrary amount then we cannot rule out the hypothesis that profits are always zero, i.e., that the decline in the share of labor is offset by an increase in the share of capital. Thus, in order to make progress I will need to make some assumptions that restrict unobserved investment and unobserved capital costs. First, I assume that investment is at least as large as depreciation. This appears to be a mild assumption, especially when applied to the analysis of long-run trends: if investment is consistently lower than depreciation then the stock of unobserved capital goes to zero. 7 Second, I assume that the required rate of return on the omitted or unobserved capital stock is R
where E π X is the expected inflation of productive asset X and δ X is the rate of depreciation of productive asset X. Last, I assume that the expected inflation of productive asset X is equal to the expected inflation of the assets classified by the BEA as intellectual property products. The results that follow are very similar if I assumed that the expected inflation of productive asset X is equal to the expected inflation of the aggregate capital stock or equal to the expected inflation of gross value added.
Under these assumptions, the correction to profits that results from taking into account this potentially omitted or unobserved capital stock is at most the net return on the capital i − E π X P X X. This implies a lower bound on true profits
In order to eliminate profits the nominal value of the unobserved capital stock has to satisfy
(2.8)
I construct the nominal value break-even stock of omitted or unobserved capital as
. This is represented on the right-hand side of equation 2.8 and is a lower bound on the nominal value of the stock of omitted or unobserved capital that rationalizes zero profits. Figure 4 plots the break-even stock of omitted or unobserved capital as a fraction of observed gross value added. The break-even unobserved capital stock is increasing during the sample period, from an estimated 70% of gross value added in 1984 to 560% in 2014. To offer a sense of magnitude, during the same period the combined value of all capital recorded by the BEA fluctuates between 135% and 185% of observed gross value added. By the end of the sample, the break-even stock of omitted or unobserved capital needs to be three times the value of the observed capital stock in order to rationalize zero profits in 2014. Indeed, the value of omitted or unobserved capital needs to be 560% of the value of observed gross value added, or $48 trillion. If the hypothesis that the decline in the properties it needs to posses in order to eliminate profits. I find that, as a fraction of gross value added, the value of this omitted or unobserved stock of capital would need to increase quadratically during the sample period and reach $48 trillion by the end of the sample. Now, an alternative approach to the problem of a potentially omitted or unobserved stock of capital is to take a stance on the precise nature of this capital and then attempt to measure it. Past research on the subject of intangible capital has taken this approach, most notably Corrado et al. (2009 Corrado et al. ( , 2012 . In Figure 4 I have included a line that represents the value of all intangible capital that is constructed by Corrado et al. (2012) , except for that stock that has already been accounted for by the BEA. As is clear from the figure, the value of the additional stock of intangible capital that is constructed by Corrado et al. (2012) does not have the needed time-series properties: the time trend of the value of this additional stock of intangible capital does not increase quadratically (as a share of observed gross value added) and the value of this capital stock is far too low (does not exceed $1.4 trillion).
From these results I conclude that the large decline in the capital share and the large increase in the profit share are unlikely to be driven by unobserved capital.
Debt and Equity Costs of Capital
Thus far, I have assumed that the cost of borrowing in financial markets is equal to the yield on Moody's Aaa bond portfolio. I now show that using the equity cost of capital or the weighted average cost of capital across debt and equity leads to larger estimated decline in the capital share. Furthermore, I show that the yield on Moody's Aaa bond portfolio that I used in the main analysis is similar in both levels and trends to the Bank of America Merrill Lynch representative bond portfolio in the overlapping period 1997-2014.
Unlike the debt cost of capital, which is observable in market data, the equity cost of capital is unobserved.
Thus, constructing the equity cost of capital requires a model of equity prices that relates observed financial market data to the unobserved equity cost of capital. A standard model for constructing the equity cost of capital is the Dividend Discount Model (DDM). In the DDM 8 the equity cost of capital is the sum of the risk-free rate and the equity risk premium, and the risk premium is equal to the dividend price ratio. Based on this model, I construct the equity cost of capital as the sum of the yield on the ten-year U.S. treasury and the dividend price ratio of the S&P 500. Figure 5 plots the debt cost of capital and the equity cost of capital. The debt cost of capital is equal to the yield on Moody's Aaa and the equity cost of capital is equal to the sum of the yield on the ten-year U.S. treasury and the dividend price ratio of the S&P 500. The figure displays several important features.
First, both the debt cost of capital and the equity cost of capital are declining during the sample period.
Second, before 1997 the equity cost of capital is higher than the debt cost of capital, but after 1997 the two costs of capital are extremely similar. As a result, calculating the required rate of return on capital using the equity cost of capital results in a greater decline in the capital share over time: at the start of the sample the capital share is larger than in my estimates and by the end of the sample the capital share is equal to my estimate. Since the debt cost of capital is lower than the equity cost of capital at the beginning of the sample and the two are approximately equal later in the sample, my constructed series of the required rate of return on capital and the capital share serve as a lower bound on the decline in capital share. Moody's Aaa has a higher grade than the representative portfolio, it also has a longer maturity and this can explain why the two portfolios have similar yields throughout the sample. The figure also shows that Moody's Baa bond portfolio closely tracts the time series trend of the Moody's Aaa bond portfolio, although the two portfolios have a different price level.
Taxes
I now consider specifications of the required rate of return on capital that include the tax treatment of capital and debt. The two specifications are common in the literature. 10 The first specification accounts for the tax treatment of capital. Unlike compensation of labor, firms are unable to fully expense investment in capital and as a result the corporate tax rate increases the firm's cost of capital inputs. In order to account for the tax treatment of capital, the required rate of return on capital of type s must be
where τ is the corporate income tax rate and z s is the net present value of depreciation allowances of capital of type s. The second specification accounts for the tax treatment of both capital and debt. Since interest payments on debt are tax-deductible, the financing of capital with debt lowers the firms' cost of capital inputs. In order to account for the tax treatment of both capital and debt, the required rate of return on capital of type s must be
I take data on the corporate tax rate from the OECD Tax Database and data on capital allowance from the Tax Foundation. I find that constructing the required rate of return on capital in accordance with equations 2.9 and 2.10 generates a decline in the capital share that ranges from 17 to 35 percent. In summary, I find that specifications of the required rate of return that include the tax treatment of capital and debt show a large decline in the capital share.
have greater than 1 year of remaining maturity, a fixed coupon schedule, and a minimum amount outstanding of $250 million." 10 See, for example, Hall and Jorgenson (1967) , King and Fullerton (1984) , Jorgenson and Yun (1991) , and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2007) . Past research has included an investment tax credit in the calculation of the required rate of return on capital; the investment tax credit expired in 1983, which is prior to the start of my sample. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Rognlie (2015) study the decline in the labor share and additionally provide an estimate of the capital share. In both cases, the authors find that the capital share is not sufficiently increasing to offset the decline in labor and further the capital share might decrease slightly.
Discussion
In this paper, I construct the capital share as S
. We can decompose my construction of the capital share into the product of three terms:
The first term in the decomposition is the ratio of nominal investment to nominal gross value added. The second term is the ratio of the nominal value of the capital stock to nominal investment. The last term is the required rate of return on capital. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) assume that the ratio of the nominal value of the capital stock to nominal investment is constant and that the required rate of return on capital is constant. 11 These assumptions lead the authors to measure the percentage change in the capital share as the percentage change in the ratio of investment to gross value added. Figure 7 plots the ratio of investment to gross value added in the U.S. corporate sector using the NIPA data. The figure shows that the ratio of investment to value added has no linear time trend. The estimated linear time trend is economically trivial and statistically zero. 12 The methodology of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) , when applied to the U.S.
non-financial corporate sector, does not suggest a decline in the capital share.
Rognlie (2015) provides two measures of the capital share. 13 In the first measure, the author assumes that the required rate of return on capital is constant. This assumptions leads the author to measure the percentage change in the capital share as the percentage change in the ratio of the value of the capital stock to gross value added. Using this measure, Rognlie (2015) finds a slight increase in the capital share.
These results are consistent with my findings: I find that the ratio of the value of the capital stock to gross value added is increasing slightly over the period 1984-2014. In the second measure, the author constructs a time series of the real interest rate from the market and book values of the U.S. corporate sector. This construction of the real cost of capital produces values that are inconsistent with observed market data.
Most importantly, the construction does not match the observed decline in market prices. Combining NIPA 11 The construction of the capital share in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) appears in Section IV.B. The assumptions of a constant ratio of the nominal value of the capital stock to nominal investment and a constant required rate of return on capital appear on p. 92.
12 These results are not directly comparable to Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) , Figure IX . There are two main differences. First, Figure IX is constructed using GDP data rather than corporate data. The GDP data include investment in residential housing and the contribution of residential housing to GDP -Rognlie (2015) provides a detailed discussion of the role of residential housing. Second, Figure IX is constructed using data over the period 1975-2011. The ratio of U.S. non-financial corporate investment to gross value added has no time trend over the period 1975-2011. 13 The construction of the capital share appears in Rognlie (2015) Section II.B.
data with the cost of capital presented in Rognlie (2015) , I find no decline in the capital share.
14 I conclude that my finding of a declining capital share in the U.S. non-financial corporate sector is new to the literature, is not due to differences in time periods, and is not due to differences in the sources or quality of data. Instead, I find a decline in the capital share due to my treatment of the required rate of return on capital. I directly infer the required rate of return from market prices. Market prices show that the required rate of return on capital declines sharply over the last thirty years, which results in a dramatic decline in the capital share. Measures of the capital share that assume a constant required rate of return show no decline.
While my research focuses on the U.S. non-financial corporate sector, there is reason to believe that many other countries experience a decline in the capital share. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) show that the rate of investment does not increase in many advanced economies. At the same time, many advanced economies experience a decline in the cost of capital, driven by a decline in government bond yields. Taken together, a large decline in the cost of capital and the constant investment rate suggest that the capital share may be declining globally. Further research is needed to study the capital share in other countries.
Model of the Corporate Sector
In this section I present a standard general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition to study the decline in the shares of labor and capital. In the model, I allow changes in technology, preferences, relative prices, and markups to cause the decline in the shares of labor and capital. The model distinguishes between two types of changes: joint movements, in which the shares of labor and capital move together, and offsetting movements, in which a change in the share of labor is perfectly offset by an equally sized change in the capital share of the opposite sign. In Proposition 1, I show that changes in technology, preferences, and relative prices can only cause offsetting movements in the shares of capital and labor; i.e., any change in preferences, technology, or relative prices that causes the labor share to decline must cause an equal increase in the capital share. A corollary to this proposition is that only an increase in markups can cause a joint decline in the shares of labor and capital.
A fully specified calibration of the model decomposes the observed changes in the shares of labor and capital into joint movements and offsetting movements. I calibrate the model to the U.S. non-financial corporate sector and show that the declines in the shares of labor and capital are entirely joint and are due 14 The cost of capital is presented in Rognlie (2015) , Figure 7 . The figure shows estimated constant, linear, and quadratic approximations to the cost of capital. The constant and quadratic approximations do not decline over the period 1984-2014. Thus, using these approximations leads to a slight increase in the capital share. The linear approximation shows a small decline in the cost of capital, equal to 2pp every 25 years. When I calculate the required rate of return on capital using this linear approximation to the real cost of capital I find no decline in the capital share.
to an increase in markups. Using the calibrated model, I further explore the welfare implications of the increase in markups. The model in this section is standard in order to ensure that my results are not due to novel modeling features, but rather are a direct consequence of my measurement of the capital share.
Model
Final Goods Producer
The corporate sector is made up of a unit measure of firms, each producing a differentiated intermediate good. The final good is produced in perfect competition as a CES aggregate of the intermediate goods
where ε t > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods. The profits of the final goods producer are 
Firms
Firm i produces intermediate good y i,t using the constant return to scale production function
where k i,t is the amount of capital used in production and l i,t is the amount of labor used in production.
In period t − 1 the firm exchanges one-period nominal bonds for dollars and purchases capital k i,t at the nominal price P K t−1 . In period t the firm hires labor in a competitive spot market at the nominal wage rate w t and produces good y i,t which is sold at price p i,t (y). After production the firm pays the face value of its debt and sells the undepreciated capital at the the nominal price P K t . The firm's nominal profits are
+ δ t is the required rate of return on capital.
The profit maximization problem of the firm determines the demand for labor and capital inputs, as well as profits, as a function of the current period nominal interest rate, the current period nominal wage rate, and aggregate output. The first-order condition for capital is p i,t ∂f ∂k = µ t R t P K t−1 , where µ t = εt εt−1 is the equilibrium markup over marginal cost. Similarly, the first-order condition for labor is p i,t ∂f ∂l = µ t w t . Integrating demand across firms determines the corporate sector demand for labor and capital inputs, as well as profits, as a function of the nominal interest rate, the nominal wage rate, and aggregate output.
Households
A representative household is infinitely lived and has preferences over its consumption {C t } and its labor {L t } that are represented by the utility function
The economy has a single savings vehicle in the form of a nominal bond: investment of 1 dollar in period t pays 1 + i t+1 dollars in period t + 1. In addition to labor income and interest on savings, the household receives the profits of the corporate sector. The household chooses a sequence for consumption {C t } and labor {L t } to maximize utility subject to the lifetime budget constraint
where a 0 is the initial nominal wealth of the household, q t = s≤t (1 + i s ) −1 is the date zero price of a dollar in period t, w t is the nominal wage in period t, Π t are nominal corporate profits in period t, and P Y t is the price of a unit of output in period t.
The utility maximization problem of the household determines the supply of labor and nominal household wealth as a function of the path of nominal interest rates, the path of nominal wage rates and the net present value of nominal corporate profits. The inter-temporal first-order condition of the household [Euler equation] is 1 = β 1 + i t+1 1 +
Uc (Ct,Lt) and the intra-temporal first-order condition
The nominal wealth of the household follows the path 
Equilibrium
In equilibrium three markets will need to clear: the labor market, the capital market and the market for consumption goods. The labor market clearing condition equates the household supply of labor with the corporate sector demand for labor. The capital market clearing condition equates the nominal value of household savings a t+1 with the nominal value of the corporate sector demand for capital P K t K t+1 . The aggregate resource constraint of the economy, measured in nominal dollars, can be written as
By Walras' law the aggregate resource constraint of the economy will hold if the labor and capital markets clear and the households are on their budget constraint. An equilibrium 16 is a vector of prices (i * t , w * t ) t∈N that satisfy the aggregate resource constraint and clear all markets in all periods. Since all firms face the same factor costs and produce using the same technology, in equilibrium 17 they produce the same quantity of output y t = Y t and sell this output at the same per-unit price p i,t = P Y t .
The Roles of Technology, Preferences and Markups
Proposition 1. When markups are fixed, any decline in the labor share must be offset by an equal increase in the capital share.
Proof. In equilibrium, a marginal allocation plan of labor across firms {dl i,t } i increases aggregate output by
Since the aggregate output response to a marginal allocation plan depends 15 Without this assumption, the relative price of capital is pinned down so long as investment is positive. In the data, investment in each asset is positive in each period. Moreover, the data show no substantial movement in the relative price of capital over the sample period.
16 Firm optimization requires that firms have beliefs over aggregate output Yt and house optimization requires that households have beliefs over corporate profits Πt. Equilibrium further requires that firm beliefs and household beliefs hold true.
17 With a constant returns to scale production technology and the specified market structure there is no indeterminacy in the firm's maximization problem. In more general cases, indeterminacy may arise, in which case there can exist non-symmetric equilibria. With appropriate regularity conditions, it is possible to select an equilibrium by assuming that for a given level of profits firms will choose to maximize their size.
only on the aggregate increase in labor dL t = 
Summing across the shares of labor and capital we have
The combined shares of labor and capital are a product of two terms: the equilibrium markup and the scale of production.
Remark 1. The proof of the proposition does not rely on any assumptions of household behavior, firm ownership, or the functional form of the production function. Furthermore, the proof does not rely on the assumption of constant returns to scale, and holds for any fixed returns to scale parameter.
Corollary 1. When markups are fixed, any change in preferences, technology or relative prices that causes the labor share to decline must cause an equal increase in the capital share.
Model-Based Counterfactual and Welfare
In this subsection I calibrate the model to and calculate the welfare consequences of the increase in markups inferred from the data.
Functional Form Specifications
I assume that firms produce using a CES production function
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. In equilibrium, aggregate output is a CES aggregate of labor and capital with parameters that are identical to the firm level production function
The first-order conditions of firm optimization are
I assume that household preferences over consumption {C t } and labor {L t } are represented by the utility
The intra-temporal first-order condition [MRS] is γL 
Moments and Parameter Values
The model has two capital parameters: the relative price of capital, which I normalize to 1, and the depre- 
Markups
The equilibrium conditions of the model imply that the cost share of gross value added is equal to the inverse of the markup µ
. In the data the markup increases from 2.5% in 1984 to 21% in 2014.
Output Gap and Welfare
I compute the steady-state decline in output and welfare in response to the increase in markups inferred from the data. I find that the increase in markups inferred from the data causes a steady-state decline in output of at least 10% and a consumption equivalent decline in utility of at least 2.9%. The declines in output and utility are greater for higher values of σ and for higher values of θ. The model can match the simultaneous decline in the shares of labor and capital, but it is unable to match decline in the real interest rate or the capital-to-output ratio. Furthermore, matching the shares of both labor and capital requires a high value of the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital.
In Section 2, I show that the decline in the capital share is due to a large decline in the risk-free rate rather than a decline in the ratio of capital to output. To match these features of the data, I consider the possibility that the steady-state interest rate declines over time. In this exercise, I vary the rate of time preference in order to match the observed change in the real interest rate. I assume that at the start of the sample the economy is in a steady state with a real interest rate of 8.5% β = 1.085 −1 and at the end of the sample the economy is a steady state with a real interest rate of 1% β = 1.01 (2004), Chirinko (2008) and Oberfield and Raval (2014) .
This evidence suggests that the increase in markups inferred from the data can explain the entire decline in the shares of both labor and capital and that the decline in the shares of labor and capital are an inefficient outcome.
Discussion
The model is based on two important assumptions: first, production is homogeneous in capital and labor;
and second, the static first-order conditions of firms are satisfied, i.e., labor and capital inputs fully adjust to their long-run levels. In any model with these two features, a change in preferences, technology, or relative prices that causes the labor share to decline must cause an equal increase in the capital share. The precise decomposition of the decline in the shares of labor and capital into a joint decline (due to an increase in markups) and offsetting movements (which can be due to preferences, technology, or relative prices) is determined in the calibration. I impose a consensus value of the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, and I find that the entire decline in the shares of labor and capital are due to an increase in markups.
Furthermore, model-based counterfactual calculations suggest that the increase in markups inferred from the data is large enough to generate a large decline in output.
The magnitude of the decline in the capital share is of central importance for understanding why the labor share has declined. To understand this point it is worth considering two hypothetical worlds. In the first hypothetical world, which matches my findings, the labor share declines 6.7 percentage points, the capital declines 7.2 percentage points, and the profit share increases 13.5 percentage points. In this world, the calibrated model tells us that the entire decline in the shares of labor and capital are joint and are entirely due to an increase in markups. In the second hypothetical world, which matches the findings of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Rognlie (2015) , the labor share declines 5 percentage points, the capital share remains constant, and the profit share increases by 5 percentage points. In this world, the calibrated model tells us that an increase in markups can account for only part of the decline. Indeed, an increase in markups would have caused the shares of both labor and capital to decline ; the labor share would have declined by less than 5 percentage points. A further change in preferences, technology, or relative prices is needed in order to increase the capital share at the expense of the labor share.
Existing research has already documented an increase in the share of profits. In addition to the work of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Rognlie (2015) , Hall (2017) documents a growing wedge between the return to capital and the risk-free real interest rate, suggestive of an increase in profits. An increase in the share of profits is not sufficient to determine the cause of the decline in the share of labor. In both hypothetical worlds described above, the share of profits increases. In order to determine the cause of the decline in the labor share we need to measure the capital share. The measurement of the capital share is also needed to determine the welfare consequences of the decline in the labor share. Indeed, based on their measurement of the capital share, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) find increasing welfare and output.
18 By contrast, based on my finding of a large decline in the capital share, I find that output declines substantially in response to the data-inferred increase in markups.
19
18 See Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) , Table IV , column 6, for their welfare results. See also Section 2.6 of this paper for a discussion of their measurement of the capital share.
19 At first glance, my calibration results look very similar to Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) (KN), Table IV , column 4. This is not, however, the case. I compute the steady-state decline in output and welfare in response to the increase in markups inferred from the data and report a lower bound on the output and consumption loss across a wide range of parameters. I consider a range for the elasticity of substitution σ and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. If I impose the production parameters of KN (σ = 1.25 and θ = 1), then I find a decline in output of 17% and a welfare-equivalent decline in consumption of 5.5%. In the second experiment, in which I allow the rate of time preference to vary, I find a decline in output of 20%. These output and welfare effects are much larger KN's. This is not surprising: due to my measurement of the capital share, I find a much larger increase in markups (a 13.5pp increase vs KN's 5pp increase). More importantly, my estimates are based on my findings that the capital share declines as rapidly as the labor share. KN reject the view of a decline in capital (KN, Table IV, My work points to a world in which the shares of capital and labor are jointly declining. This finding is new to the literature. My finding leads me to conclude that an increase in markups is the entire story.
After accounting for the increase in markups there is no room or need for change in preferences, technology or relative prices.
Labor Share and Industry Concentration
In this section I provide reduced form empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that an increase in markups plays a significant role in the decline of the labor share. In the data I am unable to directly measure markups, instead I proxy for markups using industry concentration. I assume that an increase in concentration captures increases in markups. This assumption is true in standard models of imperfect competition and is supported by Salinger (1990) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) . Using cross-sectional variation I show that those industries that experience larger increases in concentration also experience larger declines in the labor share. Univariate regressions suggest that the increase in industry concentration can account for the entire decline in the labor share. In order to construct changes in the labor share and concentration I match industries across census years.
Data
20 I construct a sample of all industries that are consistently defined over time and that have data on sales, payroll and at least one measure of concentration. In several sectors, the census separately reports data for tax-exempt firms and it is not possible to construct an industry measure of concentration. Instead, I consider only firms subject to federal income tax. The results are robust to dropping these sectors. In total, my sample consists of 750 six-digit NAICS industries. As a share of the sectors covered by the census, my matched sample covers 76% of sales receipts in 1997 and 86% of sales receipts in 2012. As a share of the U.S. private economy, 21 my matched sample covers 66% of sales receipts in 1997 and 76% of sales receipts column 4) and instead accept the view that the capital share is flat (KN, Table IV, column 6). 20 There have been minor revisions the the NAICS industry classification every census since 1997. I map NAICS industries across the censuses using the census provided concordances, which are available at https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html 21 The data on sales and payroll for the U.S. private economy are taken from Statistics of U.S. Businesses. All U.S. business in 2012. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the labor share (the payroll share of sales) and the four census measures of industry concentration for my matched sample.
Empirical Specification
I consider two reduced form empirical specifications that relate the increase in concentration to the decline in the labor share. The first empirical specification is a regression in first differences
where S L j,t − S L j,t−k is the change in the labor share of sales in industry j from year t − k to year t, and
j,t−k is the change in the concentration of sales in industry j from year t − k to year t, measured as the change in the share of sales by the 4-, 8-, 20-, and 50-largest firms. The second empirical specification is a regression in log differences
I choose two different specifications for k. In the first specification I use the two end years of data, 1997
and 2012 (k = 15). The intercept in this first specification is the predicted decline in the labor share after controlling for changes in concentration. In the second specification I use data from all four census years (k = 5). I use this specification to address concerns that the results may be due to cyclical variation. In all specifications, I weight each observation by its share of sales in year t and standard errors are clustered by 3-digit NAICS industry.
Results
I present the results of the the cross-sectional regression in two stages. First, I report the results that use only data from the 1997 and 2012 censuses. In this first set of results, the intercept of the regression is the implied change in the labor share after controlling for changes in industry concentration. Second, I report results that include data from the four censuses, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012 . The two sets of results are quantitatively similar. In both cases, I find that that an increase in concentration is associated in the cross section with a decline in the labor share (β < 0) and the observed increase in concentration can account for most, and perhaps all, of the decline in the labor share.
establishments with paid employees are included in the Statistics of U.S. Businesses reports and tables. All NAICS industries are covered, except crop and animal production; rail transportation; National Postal Service; pension, health, welfare, and vacation funds; trusts, estates, and agency accounts; private households; and public administration. Most government establishments are excluded. The slope coefficient is negative and statistically significant in each of the regressions. After controlling for changes in industry concentration, the sales weighted average decline in the labor share is statistically zero and economically small. Table 4 presents the results of the log specification and shows qualitatively similar results. Taken together, the results suggest that the increase in concentration can account for the entire decline in the labor share.
Robustness
One possible concern is that changes in the labor share are driven by business cycle fluctuations, which are correlated with changes in concentration. To address this concern I run a regression specification using all four census years (k = 5). The slope coefficients of this specification are presented in Tables 5 and 6 and are statistically indistinguishable from the slope coefficients in the main results. By using more years of data, my results are less likely to be driven by cyclical variation.
Second, the census data do not properly capture foreign competition and likely overestimate concentration in product markets for tradable goods. To the extent that foreign competition has increased over time, the census data likely overestimate increases in concentration in tradable industries. To address this concern I repeat the analysis excluding all tradable industries. 22 I find that excluding tradable industries does not alter the results. Furthermore, in the sample of tradable industries there is no cross sectional relationship between changes in measured concentration and changes in the labor share. These results are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 .
Third, in several sectors the census measures concentration separately for tax-exempt firms. This introduces measurement error in the concentration variable. Column 4 of Table 7 repeats the analysis after excluding sectors in which tax exempt firms make up a large fraction of sales (health care and social assistance, and other services). I find that excluding these sectors does not alter the results.
Last, an increase in the importance of intangible capital could cause a decline in the labor share and an increase in concentration that is unrelated to an increase in markups. Column 5 of 7 repeats the analysis 22 I use the industry classification provided by Mian and Sufi (2014) .
after excluding R&D intensive industries. 23 I find that excluding these industries does not alter the results.
Discussion
My results show that the decline in the labor share is strongly associated with an increase in concentration.
This is consistent with my hypothesis that an increase in markups plays a significant role in the decline of the labor share. Unlike the aggregate results of Section 2, the results of this section do not rely on capital data and are not subject to concerns with the measurement of capital. Using alternative sources of data and variation, this section complements my aggregate findings.
The results of this section are consistent with several price-setting mechanisms. First, the results are consistent with a model in which firms face barriers to entry, where prices are the result of monopolistic
competition. An increase in barriers to entry results in higher concentration driven by a decline in the number of firms, higher markups driven by an increase in prices, and a decline in the labor share. The results are also consistent with a model of a dominant firm and a competitive fringe, where prices are equal to the marginal cost of the firms in the competitive fringe. In such a model, an increase in the productivity of the dominant firm also results in higher concentration driven by the growth of the dominant firm, higher markups driven by a decline in production costs of the dominant firm, and a decline in the labor share.
Further research is needed to tell apart these models of competition.
Conclusion
In this paper I show that the decline in the labor share over the last 30 years was not offset by an increase in the capital share. I calculate payments to capital as the product of the required rate of return on capital and the value of the capital stock. Using aggregate time series data, I document a large decline in the capital share and a large increase in the profit share in the U.S. non-financial corporate sector over the last 30 years.
I show that the decline in the capital share is robust to many calculations of the required rate of return on capital and is unlikely to be driven by unobserved capital. I interpret these results through the lens of a standard general equilibrium model. The model is based on two important assumptions: first, production is homogeneous in capital and labor; second, the static first-order conditions of firms are satisfied, i.e., labor and capital inputs fully adjust to their long run levels. If we accept the assumptions of the model, then we are led to conclude that the decline in the shares of labor and capital are caused by an increase in markups and are an inefficient outcome. I provide reduced form empirical evidence that an increase in markups has played a significant role in the decline in the labor share. The reduced form results rely on cross-sectional variation, rather than time series variation, and do not rely on capital data. Taken as a whole, my results suggest that the decline in the shares of labor and capital are due to an increase in markups and call into question the conclusion that the decline in the labor share is an efficient outcome. This figure plots the debt cost of capital and the equity cost of capital. The debt cost of capital is set to the yield on Moody's Aaa bond portfolio and the equity cost of capital is set to the sum of the risk-free rate (yield on the ten-year treasury) and the equity risk premium (dividend price ratio of the S&P 500). See Section 2.5.2 for further details. 5 10 15 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
log C (1997, 2002, 2007, 2012) . Observations are weighted by an industry's share of sales in each census year. Standard errors are clustered by three-digit NAICS industry. Data on industry payrolls, sales and concentration are taken from the economic census. See Section 4.2 for further details.
Dependent variable: 1997 (1) (2) (3) (4) C (4) j,t − C Note: * p<0.1; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01 Table 6 : Regression in Log Difference -All Census Years The table reports results of regression of log changes in the labor on log changes in industry concentration. The unit of observation is a six-digit NAICS industry. The regressions include data from all four census years (1997, 2002, 2007, 2012) . Observations are weighted by an industry's share of sales in each census year. Standard errors are clustered by three-digit NAICS industry. Data on industry payrolls, sales and concentration are taken from the economic census. See Section 4.2 for further details.
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